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GENDER DISCRIMINATION-EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY-EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
DETERMINES THAT A NON-CONTRIBUTORY
OCCUPATIONAL PENSION SCHEME SHOULD NOT
DISCRIMINATE ON THE BASIS OF SEX. Barber v. Royal
Exchange Assurance Group, 1990 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. -, [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 513.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The late Mr. Douglas Harvey Barber brought a suit against his
employer, Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group (Guardian),'
pursuant to Great Britain's Sex Discrimination Act of 1975,2 article
I On May 26, 1989, with his case pending before the European Court of Justice,
Mr. Barber died. His widow and executrix, Pamela Barber, continued the proceedings
for and on behalf of Mr. Barber's estate with permission from the British Court
of Appeals. 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 552-53 (1990).
2 Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65, reprinted in BUTTERWORTHS ANNOTATED
LEGISLATION SERVICE (M. Beloff & H. Wilson eds. 1976). The relevant provisions
are as follows:
§ 1 .-(l) A person discriminates against a woman in any circumstances relevant
for the purposes of any provision of this Act if-
(a) on the ground of her sex he treats her less favourably than he treats
or would treat a man, or
§6.-(1) It is unlawful for a person, in relation to employment by him at
an establishment in Great Britain, to discriminate against a woman-
(a) in the arrangements he makes for the purpose of determining who should
be offered that employment, or
(b) in the terms on which he offers her that employment, or
(c) by refusing or deliberately omitting to offer her that employment.
(2) It is unlawful for a person, in the case of a woman employed by him
at an establishment in Great Britain, to discriminate against her-
(a) in the way he affords her access to opportunities for promotion, or
services, or by refusing or deliberately omitting to afford her access to
them, or
(b) by dismissing her, or subjecting her to any other detriment.
(4) Sections (l)(b) & (2) do not apply to provisions in relation to death or
retirement.
In 1986, the Sex Discrimination Act was amended to make discriminatory
retirement ages illegal. However, it does not have a retrospective effect;
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119 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community
(EEC),3 EEC Council Directive 75/117 on equal pay,4 and EEC
Council Directive 76/207 on equal treatment.' Barber challenged cer-
tain discriminatory practices of his employer's non-contributory pen-
therefore, discrimination prior to the amendment may not be affected. In
addition, the Employment Discrimination Act of 1989 fixed the retirement
age at sixty-five for men and women for the purposes of redundancy benefit.
J. STEINER, TEXTBOOK ON EEC LAw 238 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter STEINER].
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, No.
4300, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
Article 119 [Equal Pay for Men and Women]
Each Member State shall during the first stage ensure and subsequently
maintain the application of the principle that men and women should receive
equal pay for equal work.
For the purpose of this article, "pay" means the ordinary basic or
minimum wage or salary and any other consideration, whether in cash or
in kind, which the worker receives, directly or indirectly, in respect of his
employment from his employer.
4 EEC Council Directive 75/117, issued Feb. 10, 1975; 18 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 45) 19 (1975) [hereinafter Equal Pay Directive].
The Equal Pay Directive merely supplements article 119 by requiring Member
States to implement such laws as would "enable all employees who consider them-
selves wronged by failure to apply the principle of equal pay" to bring their claims
to the proper court for adjudication. Id. at art. 2. Also, the Equal Pay Directive
demands that Member States abolish all laws or regulations which reinforce or
mandate discriminatory practices, and Member States must take measures to eliminate
employer/employee agreements which facilitate discrimination. Article 1 provides:
The principle of equal pay for men and women . .. means, for the same
work or for work to which equal value is attributed, the elimination of all
discrimination on grounds of sex with regard to all aspects and conditions
of remuneration.
In particular, where a job classification system is used for determining pay,
it must be based on the same criteria for both men and women and so
drawn up as to exclude any discrimination on the grounds of sex.
Id.
EEC Council Directive 76/207, issued Feb. 9, 1976; 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 39) 40 (1976) [hereinafter Equal Treatment Directive]. The Equal Treatment
Directive is not based on article 119 of the EEC but on the institutions' general
powers under article 235 laying down the principle of equal treatment for men and
women "as regards access to employment, including promotion, and to vocational
training and as regards working conditions and . . . social security." Id. at art.
1(1). Article 2(1) defines the principle of equal treatment as meaning that "there
shall be no discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex either directly or indirectly
by reference in particular to marital or family status." Id. Article 5(1) defines
"working conditions" as including "conditions governing dismissal." Id. Further-
more, this provision may enable the application of the amended Sex Discrimination
Act of 1986. It is possible that a person could bring a claim under Directive 76/
207 against a state employer since that is who the Directive is directly affecting.
STEINER, supra note 2, at 238-9.
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sion scheme of which he was a member. 6 Barber sued Guardian after
being declared compulsorily redundant and fired.7 This termination
reduced his early retirement pension to just the cash benefits provided
for in Guardian's Severance Terms' in lieu of his normal pension
benefits. 9 These terms state that if a man becomes redundant, he is
not entitled to pension benefits unless he has reached age fifty-five. 10
Guardian declared Barber redundant at the age of fifty-two, and thus
he failed to qualify for an immediate pension." The corresponding
pensionable age for a woman is fifty. 2 Guardian paid Barber the
statutory redundancy payment and an ex gratia sum provided under
the Severance Terms. These amounts, however, were substantially
6 Barber v. Royal Exchange Assurance Group, 1990 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at
, [1990] 2 Common Mkt. L. Rep. at 518. The Guardian Royal Exchange
Assurance Group's non-contributory pension scheme was financed totally by the
employer. It was a "contracted out" scheme, meaning it was approved under the
Social Security Pensions Act of 1975. The employee member contractually waived
the earnings-related part of the state pension scheme making the Guardian's scheme
a substitute. Id. "Members of a scheme of that kind paid to the State scheme only
reduced contributions corresponding to the basic flat-rate pension payable under the
latter scheme to all workers regardless of their earnings." Id.
7 "Compulsorily redundant" means an employee is terminated either because of
an injury or illness or is fired.
' Barber, 1990 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at __, [1990] 2 Common Mkt. L. Rep.
at 519. The Guardian's Guide to Severance Terms provided for cash benefits, the
statutory redundancy payment and an ex gratia payment. Id.
9 "The severance terms confer on members of the pension fund who have attained
the age of 55 (for men) and 50 (for women) ... entitlement to an immediate pension
to be calculated in accordance with the rules of the pension fund." Barber, 1990
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at -, [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 519. In the event
of redundancy, employees who have reached these ages were to be regarded as
"retired." Thus, according to the Severance Terms, any member regarded as being
"retired" during the ten years prior to normal pensionable age is entitled to immediate
pension. However, any member who is not deemed "retired" merely receives a
deferred pension as provided by the Severance Terms. In Barber's case, he was not
considered "retired," and thus he received the statutory redundancy payment plus
an amount equal to four or five weeks salary. Had he been considered "retired,"
he would have been entitled to his entire pension. Id.
10 Barber's pensionable age according to the scheme was sixty-two; the corre-
sponding age for women was fifty-seven. Similarly, a five year difference exists for
pensionable age under the state social security scheme. Specifically, the state scheme
establishes a pensionable age of sixty-five for men and sixty for women. Once a
member of the Guardian Pension Fund attains the normal pensionable age as provided
in that scheme, he is entitled to receive an immediate pension.
1 Id. Also, members entitled to deferred pensions payable at the normal pen-
sionable age were entitled to refunds if they were at least forty years old and had
completed ten years service with the Guardian when the employment relationship
was terminated. Id.
12 Id.
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less than those to which a fifty-two year old woman would have
been entitled were she declared redundant. 3
Claiming that he was a victim of unlawful sex discrimination,
Barber initiated proceedings before the British Industrial Relations
Tribunal. 14 The Tribunal dismissed his claim at the first and second
instance." He appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal which
also found his claim to be unfounded. 6 Barber then appealed to the
British Court of Appeal which stayed the proceedings and requested
that the Court of Justice of the European Communities (the Court) 7
render a preliminary ruling pursuant to article 177 with regard to
the compatibility of Guardian's pension scheme with EEC law.'"
13 Id.
1 Barber, 1990 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at , [1990] 2 Common Mkt. L. Rep.
at 520.
11 To bring an individual claim under the Sex Discrimination Act one submits a
claim to the Industrial Tribunal. This Tribunal's decision will not bind other courts
but one may appeal to the Employment Appeals Tribunal where a decision is binding.
Recent Development, 10 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 203, 206 (1980).
16 The Employment Appeals Tribunal decided that Barber's claim was unfounded
for three reasons:
(1) Mr. Barber could not base his claim on the prohibition of discrimination
laid down in the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 because, even though there
was discrimination, that prohibition, according to section 6(4) of the Act,
was inapplicable to "provision in relation to death or retirement;"
(2) in [Burton v. British Railways] the Court of Justice decided that the
question whether a person is entitled to a benefit under a pension scheme
is one of access to pension benefits which falls to be resolved not by the
principle of equal pay but by the principle of equal treatment;
(3) finally, Directive 76/207 on equal treatment was not directly applicable
in the United Kingdom, nor could it be relied upon for the purpose of
interpreting section 6(4) of the Sex Discrimination Act, inasmuch as it was
unclear what the consequences of the Burton judgment were with regard
to a claim under an occupational pension scheme.
Barber, 1990 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at -, [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 520.
17 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at article 173, which states: "The Court of Justice
shall review the legality of acts of the Council and Commission other than recom-
mendations or opinions." The Court has liberally construed this provision to include
any measure intended to have legal effects. BROWN & JACOBS, Tm COURT OF JUSTICE
OF THE EUROPEAN Coim mumi~s 100 (3d ed. 1989) [hereinafter BROWN & JACOBS].
Member States and Institutions may bring an action under article 173(1) as well as
natural and legal persons. Id. at 102-105. A suit may be filed on the grounds that
an act infringes upon the EEC Treaty or on any rule of law relating to its application.
Id. at 116. This cause of action has led the way for the Court to rule on "general
principles common to the laws of the Member States." Id. at 120.
, This provision states:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
[Vol. 21:257
BARBER CASE
Pursuant to the article 177' 9 procedure of the EEC Treaty, the
British Court submitted five issues to the Court for consideration: 20
(1) whether benefits in connection with redundancy are "pay" under
article 119 and the Equal Pay Directive2' or whether they fall within
the Equal Treatment Directive22; (2) whether the fact that Barber was
discharged under an employer provided pension scheme was material
to the issue of discrimination; (3) whether the principle of equal pay
was violated; (4) the direct effect of article 11923 and the Equal Pay
Directive2; and (5) the necessity of considering a woman's right to
access to an immediate pension before answering whether article 119
and the Equal Pay Directive are infringed. 25 Held, a non-contributory
concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Com-
munity;
(c) the interpretations of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the
Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a member
State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the
question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of
Justice to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or
tribunal of a member State, against whose decisions there is no judicial
remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter
before the Court of Justice.
EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at article 177.
An article 177 procedure is a means by which national courts, when an EEC law
question arises, may apply to the European Court to obtain a preliminary ruling
on matters of interpretation and validity. STEINER, supra note 3, at 259.
'9 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at article 177. The purpose of the European Court
of Justice is "to ensure that through the interpretation and application of the EEC
Treaty the law is observed." The Court consists of thirteen judges, one from each
Member State, and a President of the Court, with six Advocates-General to assist.
EEC law takes precedence over all conflicting domestic law. EEC Treaty, supra note
3, at art. 164-67. See also Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585, [1964]
Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 425, in which the European Court reiterated that it is only
empowered to give rulings on matters of Community law. The Court does not have
jurisdiction to pass judgment on the compatibility of domestic law with EEC law.
Id. The Court stated that where it is asked to answer questions as to compatibility
it will simply render an abstract interpretation of EEC law on the matter in question.
Id.
2 Barber, 1990 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at -, [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep.
at 520-21.
21 Equal Pay Directive, supra note 4.
22 Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 5.
2 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 119.
24 Equal Pay Directive, supra note 4.
2 In accordance with article 177 of the EEC Treaty, the European Court of
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occupational pension scheme should not discriminate on the basis of
gender in the event of compulsory redundancy, since the benefits
paid are within the scope of article 119, and it is contrary to the
principle of equal pay to withhold a man's pension on the basis that
he has not met the requisite age when a woman in the same position
and of the same age would be entitled to her pension. 26 Barber v.
Justice considered the following questions:
(1) When a group of employees are made compulsorily redundant by their
employer in circumstances similar to those of this case and receive benefits
in connexion with that redundancy, are all those benefits "pay" within the
meaning of article 119 of the EEC Treaty and the Equal Pay Directive
(75/117/EEC), or do they fall within the Equal Treatment Directive (76/
207/EEC), or neither?
(2) Is it material to the answer to Question (1) that one of the benefits in
question is a pension paid in connexion with a private occupational pension
scheme operated by the employer ("a private pension")?
(3) Is the principle of equal pay referred to in article 119 and the equal
pay directive infringed in the circumstances of the present case if
(a) a man and a woman of the same age are made compulsorily redundant
in the same circumstances, and in connexion with that redundancy, the
woman receives an immediate private pension but the man receives only a
deferred private pension; or (b) the total value of the benefits received by
the woman is greater than the total value of the benefits received by the
man?
(4) Are article 119 and the Equal Pay Directive of direct effect in the
circumstances of this case?
(5) Is it material to the answer to Questions (3) that the woman's right to
access to an immediate pension provided for by the severance terms could
only be satisfied if she qualified for an immediate pension under the
provisions of the private occupational scheme in that she was being treated
as retired by the Guardian because she was made redundant within seven
years of her normal pension date under the pension scheme?
Barber, 1990 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at -, [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 520-
21. 2 The European Court of Justice answered the following questions referred to
it by the Court of Appeals:
1. The benefits paid by an employer to a worker in connexion with the
latter's compulsory redundancy fall within the scope of the second paragraph
of article 119 of the Treaty, whether they are paid under contract of
employment, by virtue of legislative provisions or on a voluntary basis.
2. A pension paid under a contracted-out private occupational scheme
falls within the scope of article 119 of the Treaty.
3. It is contrary to article 119 of the Treaty for a man made compulsorily
redundant to be entitled to claim only a deferred pension payable at the
normal retirement age when a woman in the same position is entitled to
an immediate retirement pension as a result of the application of an age
condition that varies according to sex in the same way as is provided for
by the national statutory pension scheme. The application of the principle
of equal pay must be ensured in respect of each element of renumeration
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Royal Guardian Assurance Group, 1990 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
__, [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 513.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Introduction
European Economic Community (EEC) law in the area of gender
equality, particularly with respect to the question of retirement and
pension plans, is complex. The term "pay," as defined under article
119,27 means "salary and any other consideration, whether in cash
or in kind, which the worker receives, directly or indirectly'"' from
his or her employer. The confusing element of this body of law is
the European Court's distinction between statutory and non-statutory
retirement plans for the purposes of applying the article 119 definition
of pay. In the past, article 119 included neither statutory retirement
and pension benefits nor redundancy pay. 29 Furthermore, the Court
distinguishes legislation defining a social security scheme for workers
generally from legislation relating to state employees.30
Another division in European employment discrimination law was
the definition of "treatment." Treatment as defined in the Equal
Treatment Directive includes not only working conditions but also
matters of social security. 3' The distinction diawn between pay and
social security benefits, for the purposes of the Equal Treatment
Directive, have been the source of much litigation. The litigation
and not only on the basis of a comprehensive assessment of the consideration
paid to workers.
4. Article 119 of the Treaty may be relied upon before the national courts.
It is for those courts to safeguard the rights which that provision confers
on individuals, in particular where a contracted-out pension scheme does
not pay to a man on redundancy an immediate pension such as would be
granted in a similar case to a woman.
5. The direct effect of article 119 of the Treaty may not be relied upon
in order to claim entitlement to a pension, with effect from a date prior
to that of this judgment, except in the case of workers or those claiming
under them who have before that date initiated legal proceedings or raised
an equivalent claim under the applicable national law.
Barber, 1990 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at -, [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 559.
27 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 119.
2' STEINER, supra note 2, at 228.
29 Defrenne v. Sabena Airlines [II], 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1365, at 1371-
72, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 98, 124.
30 Liefting v. Amsterdam Univ. Hospital, 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3225, 3227,
[1984] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 702, 705.
31 Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 5, at arts. 5 and 1.
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stems from the fact that Member States were allowed to exclude from
the equal treatment principle the "determination of pensionable age
for the purposes of granting old-age and retirement pensions." 3 2 The
Court routinely gave the "determination of pensionable age" language
a very narrow scope, refusing to apply the exclusion where pensionable
age was determined for any other purpose.3 Several different pro-
visions function as the basis for EEC employment law.
B. Article 119 and Cases Dealing with its Application
Article 119 of the EEC Treaty establishes the general principle of
equal pay for equal work for men and women. 34 This equality principle
applies only in the context of employment. 35 Some commentators
describe equality as one of the foundational principles of the EEC,36
designed to achieve both economic and social objectives. 37 The ec-
onomic goal is to ensure that Member States which implement the
equality principle are not placed at a competitive disadvantage vis-
a-vis those States which continue to discriminate. 38 The social goal
is to achieve "social progress" and to "improve ... living and work-
ing conditions" for all EEC citizens . 9
Although the EEC Treaty contains only one article which specif-
ically addresses the equality principle (article 119),40 the EEC imple-
32 Marshall v. Southampton Area Health Auth., 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
723, 729. [19861 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 688, 695.
33 Id.
34 See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at article 119 and the accompanying text.
11 Id. Since the Sex Discrimination Act is confined to an economic context, it
does not settle questions as to family organization or division of parental respon-
sibility. See also Hoffman v. Barmer Ersatzkasse, 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3042,
3047, [19861 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 242, 243 (a father had no claim under the
Equal Treatment Directive for paternity leave on his child's birth).
6 The EEC was formed in 1957 by Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Denmark, Ireland, and the United
Kingdom joined in 1973; Greece in 1981; Portugal and Spain in 1986. See Sir Barnett
Cocks, TIE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT-LONDON: HER MAJESTY'S STATIONARY OFFICE
(1973), for a discussion of EEC rules and practices.
17 Defrenne v. Sabena Airlines (Defrenne II), 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 455,
475 [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 98,117. See also Defrenne III, 1978 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. at 1378, [1978] Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 329, where the Court proclaimed
that "respect for fundamental personal human rights is one of the general principles
of Community law, the observance of which [the European Court of Justice] has
a duty to ensure. There can be no doubt that the elimination of discrimination based
on sex forms part of those fundamental rights." Id.
31 STEINR, supra note 2, at 225.
19 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at the preamble of article 117.
,0 Id. at article 119 and accompanying text.
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mented equality directives 4' to clarify any ambiguities. 42 For example,
in 1975 the Council of Ministers43 adopted the Equal Pay Directive
to clarify the meaning of "pay" as defined under article 119. 44 This
Directive applies to both the public and private sectors. It defines
concepts of "equal work" and "same work" as "work to which
equal value is attributed;" therefore, equal pay must be given for
identical W'ork as well as comparable work. 45 Also, the Equal Pay
Directive requires Member States to implement legal measures to
enable employees to bring discrimination claims for violations of the
Directive." Articles 3 and 4 of the Equal Pay Directive prohibit
discrimination in collective agreements or provisions contained in legal
regulations. 47 Furthermore, where employers implement job classifi-
cation schemes to calculate pay, they must use uniform criteria to
evaluate men and women." It is important to note that article 119
is the basis for this directive.
The European Court in Jenkins stated that "article 119 of the
[EEC] Treaty applies directly to all forms of discrimination which
may be identified solely with the aid of criteria of equal work and
equal pay referred to by the article in question." ' 49 Although this
statement establishes the supremacy of article 119, it does not clarify
the retirement and pension questions on which the European Court
of Justice's application of article 119 is inconsistent. For example,
Defrenne III established that article 119 is effective against all parties
4 Article 189 of the EEC Treaty defines a directive as "binding, as to the result
to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave
to the national authorities the choice of form and methods." Id. Originally, it was
thought that a directive could not produce direct effects because they are described
as "directly applicable" in article 189. However, the Court in Franz Grad v.
Finanzamt Traunstein, 1970 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 825, [1971] 1 Common Mkt.
L.Rep. 1, ruled that a directive could be directly effective.
41 STEINER, supra note 2, at 225.
41 The Council of Ministers is the principle legislative branch of the EEC.
- Equal Pay Directive, supra note 4; see Jenkins v. Kingsgate, 1981 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 911, 927, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 24, 37, which confirmed that
the Equal Pay Directive's purpose was to elucidate, not alter article 119.
41 Equal Pay Directive, supra note 4, at art. 1 and accompanying text.
46 Id. at art. 2. Necessary domestic implementation was required to be in effect
by February 12, 1976. At the insistence of several countries the deadline for com-
pliance was delayed until August 1978. See Bellace, A FOREIGN PERSPECTIVE IN
COMPARABLE WoRTH: ISSuES AND ALTERNATIVWES 144, Equal Employment Advisory
Council, Washington, D.C. (1980).
Equal Pay Directive, supra note 4, at arts. 3 and 4.
4 Id.
49 Jenkins, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 911, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 24.
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but restricted it to enumeration not extending to dismissal or retire-
ment conditions.50 The Court ruled that there is no general principle
of Community law prohibiting sex discrimination in such circum-
stances. 51 Furthermore, the Court held in Defrenne v. Belgian State
(Defrenne 1) that although payment in the nature of social security
benefits is not excluded from the concept of "pay," as defined under
article 119, social security schemes and pension benefits are settled
by Belgian law and, therefore, do not represent consideration paid.52
The Court's decision rested upon the fact that the social security
scheme was statutory, as opposed to occupational. 51 In Defrenne v.
Sabena Airlines (Defrenne II), the plaintiff, an airline stewardess,
was successful in invoking article 119 against her employer, Sabena
Airlines, to claim the right to pay equal to that of her male coun-
terparts. 54 The Court noted that article 119 applies directly to "pay. 55
However, the Court also held that pension benefits were not "pay"
and, therefore, article 119 did not apply to pension benefits.16
Conversely, the Court held in Worringham v. Lloyds Bank Ltd.
that a plan to pay sums into male employees' occupational pension
scheme and not females' was discriminatory.5 7 The plan differentiated
between men and women under the age of twenty-five. 51 Men con-
tributed five percent of their salaries to the pension scheme, whereas
women under twenty-five were exempt from contributing and could
-1 Defrenne [III], 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1365, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt.
L. Rep. at 312. The Court stated as follows:
Article 119, which does have direct effect, does not extend to incidents of
the work relationship other than pay. The fact that certain conditions of
employment, such as a special age limit, may have pecuniary consequences
will not necessarily bring them within article 119, which is based on the
close connection which exists between the nature of the services provided
and the amount of renumeration. Id.
S1 [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 330.
52 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 445, [1971] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 494. Social
security schemes or benefits, particularly retirement pensions, which are not within
the scope of the national system of social security were not excluded in Defrenne
[I]; however, in Defrenne [III], the Court excluded these occupational pension schemes
from article 119 protection. [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 1365.
53 [1971] Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 496.
14 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1378, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 326.
51 [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 328.
56 Id. at 320.
57 Worringham, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 795, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.
Rep. at 1.
58 [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 3.
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claim no equity in the pension fund upon leaving the bank before
age twenty-fivei 9 Furthermore, the bank funded the men's five percent
in the form of a five percent addition to their annual pay.60 The
European Court held the contributions to be pay as defined by article
119.61
The Court followed Worringham in Bilka-Kaufaus GmbH v. Weber
von Hartz, where it held that a scheme restricting part-time employees'
access to a non-contributory scheme which supplemented social se-
curity was discriminatory. 62 Part-time workers at Bilka were primarily
women. Furthermore, the scheme was contractual, not statutory in
origin and, therefore, the benefits constituted consideration paid by
the employer to the employee.63
Liefting v. Amsterdam University Hospital challenged the statutory/
contractual dichotomy." A statutory pension scheme for civil servants
treated husbands and wives as one person for contribution purposes.65
This resulted in a policy of female civil servants whose husbands
were also civil servants receiving substantially smaller contributions.66
The defendant, citing Defrenne [II], tried to argue that the scheme
was a statutory social security scheme and, therefore, not within the
scope of article 119. The Court disagreed, ruling that a statutory
social security scheme was not per se outside the scope of article
119.67 The principle of equal opportunity was expanded to include
more areas than just pay.
59 Id. at 2.
6o Id.
61 Id.
62 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1607, 1625, [1986] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 701.
613 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1630.
64 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 377, [19841 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 702.
65 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 378.
Id. at 377.
67 Id. In interpreting Liefting, one should remember that the legislatively adopted
social security scheme is not the same as a legislatively imposed social security scheme
on workers in general by the State. Thus, the former may be the subject of Directive
86/378, while the latter may be the subject of the Social Security Directive. See
Newstead v. Department of Transport, 1987 E. Comm Ct. J. Rep. 4753, [1988] 1
Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 219. In this case a confirmed bachelor filed a suit charging
that a compulsory deduction for a pension scheme, actually for widows, from male
civil servants and not female was discriminatory. The pension was to be repaid with
interest in the event a civil servant left the service unmarried. The Court decided
that this scheme was occupational in nature under Directive 86/378. Furthermore,
the action failed because it fell within an exception under the Equal Treatment
Directive. See supra note 4, at art. 2(1) and accompanying text.
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C. The Equal Treatment Directive and Cases Dealing with its
Application
In 1976, the Council drafted the Equal Treatment Directive, 68 which
was not based on article 119 but on article 235.69 Its essential purpose
was to enhance opportunities for female employees. 70 The tenets of
the Equal Treatment Directive were equal access to employment
opportunities, vocational training, promotions, and working condi-
tions regardless of sex-thus furthering the abolition of direct or
indirect discrimination based on sex.7' Three exceptions to the Equal
Treatment Directive, however, did allow Member States to distinguish
between men and women where: (1) gender was a determining factor
in the ability of the person to perform the work; (2) the provision
protected women; or (3) the provision promoted equal opportunity
for men and women.
72
The primary obstacle facing the Equal Treatment Directive was the
extent to which it could be "directly effective. 73 Unlike the Equal
" See supra note 4.
69 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 235, provides:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course
of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the
Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the
Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and
after consulting the Assembly, take the appropriate measures.
Id.
70 Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 4. In the United Kingdom, the Treatment
Directive has been used to challenge the discriminatory retirement ages prescribed
for men and women, since the Sex Discrimination Act excludes from its scope death
and retirement provisions. STEINER, supra note 2, at 237.
,1 Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 4.
72 Id. at art. 2(2)-(4). The Directive is unclear as to how the exceptions interact
with the principle of equal treatment.
,3 Direct effect refers to an enforceable Community right which is applicable to
all Member States. EEC measures that are binding have vertical effect, meaning
they affect Member States. If it binds parties as well, it is said to have horizontal
effect. Many EEC sex discrimination matters lack horizontal effect, thus leaving an
employee's rights subject to the status of his or her employer. See Defrenne [II],
1976 Eur. Comm. Ct. Rep. at 458, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 122-123, where
Defrenne argued that the principle of equal pay "represents the application of a
general principle of equality which forms part of the philosophy common to the
Member States." Id. The European Court held that article 119 applied horizontally
referring to its economic and social aims and not its general principle of equality.
See infra Marshall v. Southampton and S.W. Hampshire Area Health Authority
(Teaching), 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 725, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 688.
The Court strictly interpreted article 1(2) of the Equal Treatment Directive because
of the "fundamental importance of the principle of equality of treatment." Id. at
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Pay Directive which was authorized by article 119, the Equal Treat-
ment Directive was based on article 235, the general law-making
provision of the EEC Treaty. 74 The Court clarified the matter in
Marshall v. Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health
Authority (Teaching), which held that the Equal Treatment Directive
could be invoked directly against the Member State as an employer;
however, it was not directly applicable against a private person. 75
Marshall's dismissal from a State health agency simply because she
reached pensionable age, which was five years younger than a male's,
was discriminatory and contrary to the Equal Treatment Directive. 76
Marshall raised the "fundamental rights" argument under article
1 1977 established in Defrenne v. SABENA Airlines, (Defrenne [III),78
yet the Court focused its decision on the direct violations of the
Equal Treatment Directive and the Social Security Directive. 79 The
709. Ultimately, the Court held that article 5(1) was directly effective against the
State as an employer or public authority but not against a private employer. Id. at
711.
74 STEINER, supra note 2 at, 241. It was clear that the equal treatment could be
directly effective against the State, yet unclear whether it could be invoked against
the State as an employer. Even more equivocal was the question of whether it could
be invoked against a private person.
7, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 725, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 688;
where the Court stated:
[Ilt must be emphasized that according to article 189 of the EEC Treaty
that the binding nature of a directive, which constitutes the basis for the
possibility of relying on the directive before a national court, exists only
in relation to "each member State to which it is addressed." It follows
that a directive may not of itself impose obligations on an individual and
that a provision of a directive may not be relied upon as such against such
a person.
[1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 711. See also Roberts v. Tate & Lyle Industries
Ltd., 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 703, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 714.
76 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 723, 746; (1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 688,
709.
7 Compare Defrenne [II], 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 458, [1976] Comm.
Mkt. L. Rep. at 114. The Court held that article 119 was directly effective against
individuals as well as Member States. Id. at 476; [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at
125.
71 1978 E.Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1365, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 312. This
case established that the elimination of discrimination based on sex is a "fundamental
right." It involved a flight attendant who challenged a provision of her employment
contract which required female employees to terminate employment at the age of
forty. Id. Although the Court proclaimed equal treatment a "fundamental right,"
it rejected Defrenne's claim saying that it lacked basis in Community law because
it did not fall within article 119. Id. at 1378; [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 329.
79 Marshall, 1986 Eur. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 740-43, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.
19911 269
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purpose of the Social Security Directive was to implement the principle
of equal treatment for men and women.8 0
The Social Security Directive (Council Directive 79/7), the equality
directive addressing social security schemes, specifically applied to
statutory schemes providing protection against the risks of old age
and unemployment and implementing the principles of equal treatment
in statutory schemes."' Since the Social Security Directive applied to
statutory social security schemes, its effects must be vertical. That
is, they were only invocable against a State, as opposed to horizontal
effectiveness which referred to private persons. Furthermore, the
Social Security Directive overlapped the Equal Treatment Directive,82
Rep. at 705-06. The Court answered two questions: (1) whether the dismissal of
Marshall violated the Equal Treatment Directive; and (2) if so, whether Marshall
could rely on it in a British court given the inconsistencies between the Equal
Treatment Directive and the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975. The Court held that
the Equal Treatment Directive had been violated and it could be relied upon not-
withstanding the state authority. Id. at 751; [19861 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 712-
13.
', EEC Council Directive 79/7, issued Dec. 19, 1978; 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 6) 24 (1979) [hereinafter the Social Security Directive]. The Directive applies to:
(a) statutory schemes providing protection against sickness, invalidity, old age, ac-
cidents at work or occupational diseases and unemployment; and (b) social assistance,
in so far as it is intended to supplement or replace these schemes Id. at article 3(1).
Article 1(1) states that the Directive's purpose is as follows: "to put into effect in
the Member States the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards
access to employment, including promotion, and to vocational training as regards
working conditions." Article 2 applies the Directive to the working population
including "self-employed persons, workers and self-employed persons whose activity
is interrupted by illness, accident or involuntary unemployment and persons seeking
employment-and to retired or invalided workers and self-employed persons." Article
3(3) relates to the implementation of the equal treatment principle in occupational
schemes to be adopted in the future. Article 5 states as follows: "Application of
the principle of equal treatment with regard to working conditions, including the
conditions governing dismissal, means that men and women shall be guaranteed the
same conditions without discrimination on grounds of sex." Article 7 permits Member
States to exclude the following matters from the scope of the equal treatment
principle:
(a) the determination of pensionable age for purposes of old-age and
retirement pensions and possible consequences thereof for other benefits;
(b) benefits or entitlements granted to persons who have brought up children;
(c) wives' derived old-age or invalidity benefits, and
(d)increases granted in respect of dependent wives related to long-term
invalidity, old-age, accidents at work and occupational disease benefits.
Id.
Id. at art. 3.
82 See Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 5, at article 1(1) and accompanying
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since it merely implemented the principle of equal treatment in the
social security field.83
The Council designed Directive 86/378, which was complimentary
to the Social Security Directive," to mandate the implementation of
equal treatment for men and women in occupational, in contrast to
statutory, pension schemes.83 Implementation was required by all
Member States by July 31, 1989;8 yet even before the implementation
of Directive 86/378 an employer's contribution to an occupational
scheme may be deemed as "pay" thus falling under article 119.87
Council Directive 86/378 is nearly identical to the Social Security
Directive; however, it contains no exclusions for survivor and family
benefits. 88 Furthermore, Directive 86/378 expressly prohibits different
retirement ages for men and women.8 9 Both directives allow suspension
of the principle of equal treatment regarding the determination of
pensionable age when granting old-age or retirement pensions and
other similar benefits.9
13 See Burton v. British Railways Bd., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 555, 576;
[1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 136, 157.
", See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
81 EEC Council Directive 86/378, issued July 24, 1986; 29 O.J. Eua. Comm. (No.
L 225) 40 (1986). This Directive applies to the following schemes:
[S]chemes not governed by Directive 79/7/EEC whose purpose is to provide
workers, whether employees or self-employed, in an undertaking or group
of undertakings, area of economic activity or occupational sector or group
of such sectors with benefits provided by statutory social security schemes*
or to replace them, whether membership of such scheme is compulsory or
optional.
Id. at article 2.
Article 4(a) refers to occupational schemes which provide protection against risks
of old age, including early retirement, and unemployment. Article 5 prohibits in
general terms any discrimination on the basis of sex. Article 6 lists a number of
provisions, including those directly or indirectly based on sex . . . [including] "(e)
setting different conditions for the granting of benefits or restricting such benefits
to workers of one or other of the sexes; (f) fixing different retirement ages .... .
Id.
Id. at article 12. Although implementation expired July 31, 1989, states are
allowed until January 1, 1993 to take "all necessary steps to ensure that the provisions
of the occupational [pension] schemes contrary to the principle of equal treatment
are revised . . . ." Id. at art. 8.
" See Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. Karin Weber yen Hartz, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 1607, at 1625-26.
u EEC Council Directive 86/378, issued July 24, 1986. 29 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No.
L. 225) 46 (1986).
" Id. at article 6(f).
Id. at art. 9.
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Burton v. British Railways tested the scope of the equality direc-
tives.91 British Rail operated a voluntary redundancy scheme in which
women could apply for voluntary redundancy at age fifty-five and
men at age sixty2 Burton filed suit, claiming the scheme was dis-
criminatory. 93 Since the scheme fell within the exemption of the Sex
Discrimination Act of 1975 which excluded provisions in relation to
death or retirement,94 Burton turned to the Equal Treatment Direc-
tive.95 The Court ruled that the Directive did indeed apply to the
conditions and terms of voluntary redundancy schemes. 96 However,
the ages in British Railway's scheme were referenced to the statutory
retirement age and, therefore, the Court was bound to follow Directive
79/7, which permitted States to exclude from the equal treatment
principle "the determination of pensionable age." 97
Another case in which the European Court endeavored to flesh
out the scope of the Equal Treatment Directive was Razzouk v.
Commission.9" The Razzouk Court rested its decision on the fun-
damental right to equal treatment. 99 The plaintiff's deceased wife was
an EEC functionary and upon her death Razzouk was denied a
survivor's pension because the staff regulations for the EEC provided
different survivor's pension schemes based on the gender of the
deceased. 01 0 Citing Defrenne [III], the Court held that "the principle
of equal treatment of both sexes . . . forms part of the fundamental
rights the observance of which the Court has a duty to ensure."''
This case was unique because it applied the "fundamental right"
principle established in Defrenne [111] 102 to equal treatment as defined
11 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 578, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 136. The
criterion for distinguishing between equal treatment and equal pay may be expressed
as follows: the first principle applies to the conditions of eligibility for a benefit,
while the second applies to the benefit given to those who satisfy the qualifying
condition. Id. at 148.
92 Id. at 557; [1982 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 138.
13 Id. at 558; [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 139.
9, Sex Discrimination Act, supra note 3, at sec. 6(4).
91 Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 5.
9 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 575; [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 156.
"I See Social Security Directive, supra note 80, at article 7(a) and accompanying
text.
98 Razzouk v. E.C. Commission, 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1509, [1984] 3
Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 470.
" Id. at 1530; [1984] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 491.
10 Id. at 1529-30; [1984] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 491.
101 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1522.
102 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1365, [1978] Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 312.
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under the Equal Treatment Directive as opposed to equal pay under
article 119.
D. Employment Discrimination Laws in Great Britain and
Applicable Cases
Member States of the EEC are subject to the articles of the EEC
Treaty and have a duty to implement article 119 and other equality
directives within their domestic law accordingly. 03 In 1975, the United
Kingdom passed the Sex Discrimination Act' °4 amending the British
Equal Pay Act which had been designed to effectuate the equality
principle contained in article 119.105 In 1970, the Equal Pay Act
introduced the right to equal pay for women in Great Britain by
requiring men and women to be paid equally if they were employed
in "like work" and if a woman's work was "rated as equivalent"
to that of a man. 1°6 The British Equal Pay Act did not satisfy the
EEC's Equal Pay Directive' and the European Commission instigated
103 See Fitzpatrick, European Women Entitled to Equal Pay For Work of Equal
Value, 34 FED. BAR NEws & J. 384 (1987) [hereinafter Fitzpatrick]. The necessary
domestic implementing legislation was required to be in effect by February 12, 1976.
104 Sex Discrimination Act, supra note 2.
1o British Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41 [hereinafter Equal Pay Act]. The relevant
provisions as originally enacted are as follows:
1.-(1) The provisions of this section shall have effect with a view to securing
that employers give equal treatment as regards terms and conditions of
employment to men and to women, that is to say that (subject to the
provisions of this section and of section 6 below),
-(a) for men and women employed on like work the terms and conditions
of one sex are not in any respect less favourable than those of the other,
and (b) for men and women employed on work related as equivalent (within
the meaning of subsection (5) below) ....
Id.
However, as originally enacted the Equal Pay Act excluded provisions relating to
death or retirement:
(1) [N]or shall that requirement extend to requiring equal treatment as
regards terms and conditions related to retirement, marriage or death or
to any provision made in connection with retirement, marriage or death;
and the requirements of section 3(4) of this Act shall be subject to cor-
responding restrictions.
(2) Any reference in this section to retirement includes retirement, whether
voluntary or not, on grounds of age, length of service or incapacity.
Id.
106 Id. The Equal Pay Act did not satisfy the law of the 1975 Equal Pay Directive
because it was a "like work" act and the Equal Pay Directive refers to "work to
which equal value is attributed."
I'" The Equal Pay Act was limited because in order to determine comparable
worth it required, first, a job evaluation study. Second, only certain job evaluation
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proceedings to require compliance with the Directive.'°0 This prompted
Great Britain to pass the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 which
attempted to bring British law into compliance with the Equal Pay
Directive. 09
To dissolve ongoing discrimination in pension plans, the Sex Dis-
crimination Act required "equal access" to pension schemes for men
and women. Yet it still permited sex discrimination when it arose
out of a "provision in relation to retirement.""10 The British Em-
ployment Appeals Tribunal construed this exception broadly. In Rob-
erts v. Cleveland Area Health Authority,"' the Court ruled that a
female hospital worker who was forced to retire at age sixty, while
her male counterpart did not have to retire until sixty-five, could
bring no discrimination action under the Sex Discrimination Act
because section 6(4) of the Act exempts pension provisions establishing
one's retirement age from the general rule." 2 The absence of pro-
visions relating to retirement and pensions resulted in a challenge by
the European Commission of the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 on
three grounds. First, the mechanisms employed by the United King-
studies were permitted. Third, the only way to have a job evaluation study performed
was with the consent of the employer. Few employers agreed to'this and, therefore,
the comparable worth provision of the Equal Pay Act had little or no meaning.
See Fitzpatrick, supra note 103, at 385.
-o The Commission of the EEC sent a letter to Great Britain on April 3, 1979,
to inform the government that proceedings would begin if Great Britain did not
comply. The Commission requested Great Britain to comply with article 119 on May
9, 1980. Great Britain did not comply so proceedings began on March 18, 1981.
See Note, United Kingdom Laws Fail to Satisfy EEC Equal Pay Directive Requiring
Equal Pay for Men and Women for Work of Equal Value: Commission of the
European Communities v. United Kingdom, 18 TEX. INT'L L. J. 380 (1983).
-o Fitzpatrick, supra note 103, at 385.
110 While "equal access" applies to pensions schemes, provisions in the Equal Pay
Act relating to death and retirement were deleted from the "equal access" require-
ment:
(A) An equality clause and those provisions-
(a) shall operate in relation to terms relating to membership of an occu-
pational scheme (within the meaning of the Social Security Pension Act of
1975) so far as those terms relate to any matter in respect to which the
scheme has to conform with the equal access requirements of Part IV of
the Act;
(b) by subject to this, shall not operate in relation to terms related to death
or retirement, or to any provision made in connection with death or re-
tirement.
Equal Pay Act, supra note 105.
Roberts v. Cleveland Area Health Authority, 1978 I.C.R. 370.
1,2 Id. at 375; C.f. Sex Discrimination Act, supra note 3, at sec. 6(4)(excluding
provisions relating to death or retirement).
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dom were inadequate to remove discriminatory provisions in collective
agreements and rules governing independent employers. Second, the
exemptions in the 1975 Act for private households and small un-
dertakings violated the equality directives; and third, the exclusion
of the midwife from the 1975 Act also violated EEC directives." 3
The European Commission prevailed on the first and second counts
before the Court of Justice." 4
Reacting to the decisions in Commission v. United Kingdom and
Marshall, the United Kingdom amended the Sex Discrimination Act
in 1986."' First, section 6(4) was amended to render unlawful, in
specified circumstances, discrimination with regard to retirement on
the basis of sex." 6 Second, the amended Sex Discrimination Act
prohibits an employer from dismissing an employee on the basis of
an age limit which discriminates between the sexes. "' These amend-
ments are consistent with the holding in Marshall."8 However, the
amended Sex Discrimination Act excludes a "provision in relation
to retirement" including benefits, facilities and services unless it is
related to a woman's dismissal or demotion which would violate the
Equal Treatment Directive rather than the Sex Discrimination Act.1 9
"3 Commission v. United Kingdom, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3431, [1984] 1
Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 44.
114 Id.
" Sex Discrimination Act, supra note 2. The 1986 amendment to the Sex Dis-
crimination Act includes provisions to end discrimination in retirement schemes.
Furthermore, the Employment Act of 1989 fixed the retirement age at sixty-five for
men and women. Neither of these two acts is retrospective. However, if a person
is a state employee suffering from discrimination prior to the Acts' entry into force,
he or she may have an action under the Equal Treatment Directive, since it was
designed to directly effect claims against a state employer. See Marshall, 1986 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 725, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 688, in which the Court
clarified two questions: (1) whether a different retirement age for men and women
breached the Equal Treatment Directive and (2) if so, whether Mr. Marshall (the
plaintiff) could rely on it. In this case the Sex Discrimination Act and the Equal
Treatment Directive were at odds on the discriminatory retirement age question.
After much deliberation, the Court decided that the Equal Treatment Directive had
been breached stating " where a person involved in legal proceedings is able to rely
on a Directive against a State he may do so regardless of the capacity in which the
latter is acting, whether employer or public authority." Id. On the other hand, a
Directive is only binding on "each member State to which it is addressed." EEC
Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 189. This is avoided if the Member State concerned
has correctly adopted and implemented the Directive into national law.
116 Sex Discrimination Act, supra note 2.
117 Id.
"I Marshall, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 725, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep.
688.
119 Sex Discrimination Act, supra note 2.
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This is motivated by Britain's refusal to have the Sex Discrimination
Act apply to an employee's entitlement to redundancy pay or oc-
cupational pensions. 20 In other words, the amended Sex Discrimi-
nation Act still allows discrimination in retirement plans. The paradox
here is that the Marshall Court was very concerned with separating
employment questions from social security questions and guaranteeing
the former complete protection under the Equal Treatment Direc-
tive.' 2 ' Regardless of the British government's intention to exclude
redundancy pay, redundancy pay is an employment question, not a
social security question. 22
The United Kingdom's reluctance to fully implement article 119
and the equality directives into its national law is evidenced by the
discriminatory exclusion of retirement plans in the Sex Discrimination
Act of 1986. This perhaps was remedied by the European Court's
decision in Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein Westfalen.123
In Von Colson, the Court, applying the Equal Treatment Directive,
stated that interpretation of the directive does not have to conform
to the interpretation of national legislation subsequent to the adoption
of the directive concerned because Community law takes precedence
over all provisions of national law. 124 Von Colson established the
principle of "indirect effects" which challenges Great Britain to
interpret its national legislation pursuant to EEC law. 125 "The answer
should be that [Great Britain] will make every effort to maintain
consistency.' ' 26 However, commentators argue that "British Courts
do not even voluntarily uphold the principle and that many decisions
violate its spirit."' 2 7 Obstacles to British application of the funda-
'2 See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Van Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1984 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 1891, [1984] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 430. The case involved two women
imprisoned at a public prison which also housed male prisoners. The women brought
suit pursuant to the Equal Treatment Directive.
124 Id.
12, Id. "Indirect effects" refers to the effects of EEC law on a Member State's
national law.
126 Legislation, The Sex Discrimination Act, 50 MOD. L. R. 934, 937 (1989)
[hereinafter Legislation]. After Von Colson, 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1891,
[1986] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 430, there was speculation as to how far the
United Kingdom courts would go in referring terms of the EEC directives to in-
terpretation of the Sex Discrimination Act of 1986.
127 Note, Fundamental Misconceptions About Fundamental Rights: The Changing
Nature of Women's Rights in the EEC and Their Application in the United Kingdom,
31 HARv. INT'L L.J. 565, 589 (1990).
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mental right of sexual equality include the principles of parliamentary
sovereignty, stare decisis, the problem of sources, and jurisdictional
restraints. 128
III. ANALYsis
In Barber v. Royal Exchange Assurance Group,'29 the European
Court of Justice took an important step toward achieving equal
treatment for men and women under pension plans. The Court rea-
soned that private occupational pension redundancy benefits do qual-
ify as "pay" under article 119.130 The difficulty which the Court had
in reconizing this fundamental concept of equal treament indicates
a reluctance within the United Kingdom (and perhaps the European
institutions) to fully implement the principles of equality. 3' The ev-
olution of the European Community case law, though meandering,
finally has resulted in a reasonable rule of law consistent with the
mandate of the Court.132
In Defrenne [III], the European Court of Justice elevated freedom
from sex discrimination to the status of a "fundamental right." The
Court defined a contractually mandated retirement age to be a "work-
ing condition" rather than "pay," thus negating the "fundamental
right" principle established under article 119. The Court stated un-
equivocally that "fundamental personal human rights is one of the
128 Id. at 590. First, parliamentary sovereignty is an obstacle to the application
of the fundamental right. While British courts interpret parliamentary acts in the
light of "fundamental rights," the Acts of Parliament remain supreme. Furthermore,
British courts have either construed legislation in line with EEC law or upheld
inconsistent national legislation on the grounds that the relevant EEC directive lacked
direct effect. Id. at 598. Secondly, the British court's adherence to stare decisis
weakens the fundamental right to be free from sex discrimination, since the British
courts follow precedence rather that uphold the fundamental right. Id. at 599-600.
Third, "[tihe sources of the fundamental right for British courts must be an EEC
directly effective traditional measure or an ECJ [European Court of Justice] judgment
applying the right, since the right itself is not directly effective." Id. United Kingdom
courts might apply the fundamental right of sexual equality more readily if the EEC
Treaty expressly declared it as fundamental or held to be directly effective. Id. at
601. Fourth, "[s]o long as the fundamental right lacks direct effect, an Industrial
Tribunal may not have jurisdiction to consider it." Id. at 602.
'2 Barber, 1990 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at -, [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep.
at 514.
130 [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 513.
3I See generally, Burton, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 576, [1982] 2 Comm.
Mkt. L. Rep. at 136 ; Defrenne [III], 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1365, [1978]
3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 312.
32 BROWN & JACOBS, supra note 17, at 119-20.
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general principles of Community Law, the observance of which [the
European Court] has a duty to ensure. There can be no doubt that
the elimination of discrimination based on sex forms part of those
fundamental rights."' 3 Inexplicably, however, the Court recanted its
declaration for fundamental rights by demoting the so-called "fun-
damental right" to a "qualified right."
The Court's characterization of a mandatory retirement age as a
working condition not subject to article 119 is inconsistent with
principles of non-discrimination. By denying the plaintiff the right
to equality in this respect, the Court declared that the fundamental
right contained in article 119 excludes dismissal or retirement con-
ditions. 134 Implicit in the concept of a fundamental right is the notion
that the right is so basic and essential that even in the most ques-
tionable circumstances it should be preserved. Furthermore, if the
right is fundamental, a violation of such a right in any form would
be subjected to the strictest scrutiny. 13S In Defrenne III, the Court
curiously declared freedom from sex discrimination a fundamental
right when in fact it refused to enforce it as a fundamental right. 36
The fundamental rights argument has been relied upon in other
EEC discrimination cases. For instance, the Razzouk Court also relied
on the fundamental rights principle'3 which holds equal treatment
as a fundamental right which the Court has a duty to protect. 38
While seeming to advance the fundamental rights principle, the Court
actually may have taken this bold step because the equality directives
do not apply to the EEC institutions. On the other hand, Razzouk
could be seen as affirming the fundamental rights principle laid down
in Defrenne III. Without actually following Defrenne III, the Razzouk
Court held that equal treatment was a fundamental right, whereas
Defrenne III denied protection.
"I See Defrenne [Il], 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1365, [1978] Comm. Mkt.
L. Rep. at 312, 329 (Elimination of sex discrimination is part of the fundamental
personal human rights).
114 [1978] Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 330.
"5 R. DwoRIN, TAKnWO RiGHTs SEMOUSLY 184 (1977). Dworkin distinguishes
"fundamental rights" from other rights by saying that "fundamental rights" are
rights "in the strong sense;" and no special grounds justify interfering with a
"fundamental right." Id. at 190.
136 Defrenne [III], 1978 Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1365, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.
Rep. at 312.
137 Razzouk, 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1509, [1984] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep.
407.
3 Id. at 1529-30, [19841 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 490.
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The Razzouk holding is desireable for several reasons. First, the
Court dispensed with the formalities of interpreting article 119. Al-
though technically article 119 would not have applied since Razzouk
dealt with a survivor's pension scheme and not "pay," the Court
creatively upheld the principles of article 119 by pointing out that
Razzouk did not actually seek application of article 119. Instead
Razzouk's application to the Court used the words "in conformity
with the principles laid down in article 119 of the EEC Treaty .... ,, 19
Rejecting a more formalistic approach, the Court found in favor of
Razzouk. Ordinarily, the Court would have rejected Razzouk's claim
outright on the basis that article 119 did not apply to a survivor's
pension scheme. Instead the Court adhered to the spirit, not the
letter, of article 119140 and construed "the principles laid down in
article 119" to mean equality of treatment for both men and women
and stated that the principle "forms part of the fundamental rights
the observance of which the Court has a duty to ensure."'' 4'
Interestingly, both Defrenne [II] and Razzouk involved discrimi-
natory contracts relating to employment, yet the Court treated each
case differently. In Defrenne [III], the termination of a woman's
employment contract at the age of forty was deemed to be a "working
condition" relating to "treatment," and thus was not "pay." The
survivor's pension scheme in Razzouk was also said to constitute
"treatment," not "pay." However, in contrast to its decision in
Defrenne III, the Court held the scheme to fall within the principles
laid down by article 119. The conflict in these two cases raised the
question of whether "treatment" properly falls within the scope of
article 119, or whether a plaintiff, complaining of merely discrimi-
natory treatment, must rely on the Equal Treatment Directive which
the Court has not proclaimed to be a per se "fundamental right."
If treatment falls within the scope of article 119 as implied by Raz-
zouk, it may actually fall under the definition of "pay," since treat-
ment does have pecuniary consequences. However, if article 119 does
not apply and treatment falls only within the scope of the Equal
Treatment Directive and related directives, plaintiffs suffering dis-
crimination will be granted relief only in limited circumstances.
The "fundamental right" argument was used effectively in Mar-
shall, which was decided under the Equal Treatment Directive' 42 rather
139 Id. at 1520 [1984] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 481.
11o Id. at 1530, [1984] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 491.
I4 d. [1984] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 491.
142 See supra note 5.
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than article 119.143 Marshall contended that "the elimination of dis-
crimination on grounds of sex forms the part of the corpus of
fundamental human rights and therefore one of the general principles
of Community Law." The Court interpreted the Equal Treatment
Directive to facilitate the fundamental right to equal treatment. How-
ever, the Court retreated from its earlier tortured interpretation of
article 119 in Razzouk, in part due to the fact that Marshall involved
a Member State and not a Community institution. This interpretation
foreclosed acceptance of the fundamental right principle of Razzouk.
The Court found this to be significant because, although articles in
the EEC Treaty apply to private parties as well as Member States,
directives only address Member States. This lends credence to the
vertical effects versus horizontal effects distinction.'" Marshall seems
to set the stage for equal treatment, as defined under the Equal
Treatment Directive rather than article 119, to gain fundamental right
status; yet the Equal Treatment Directive only directly effects Member
States. Given that the directive does not apply to individuals, the
decision is somewhat hollow.
Besides an unwillingness on the part of Member States to implement
article 119 and related equality directives, the Court has bound itself
by its continued distinction between "pay" and "treatment." Log-
ically, there is not principled basis for distinguishing between "pay"
and "treatment." 45 The pension benefits one expects to receive upon
retirement are just as much a part of one's compensation as the
141 Marshall, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 728, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep.
at 688-689.
- The rationale for giving a directive any effects at all is that Member States
must only rely, even in their own national courts, on laws consistent with the EEC
Treaty, including any directives. The conclusion is the vertical (meaning affecting
the Member States) - horizontal (meaning effecting private parties) distinction. Leg-
islation, supra note 126, at 934.
14, In the United States, the terms "pay" and "treatment" are settled by Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. 2000(e) [hereinafter Title VII]. For
instance, Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 487 U.S. 223 (1978),
held that unequal pension plan contributions for male and female employees based
on actuarial tables reflecting a woman's greater life span violated the sex discrim-
ination provisions of Title VII. Furthermore, in Los Angeles Dept. of Water, the
United States Supreme Court extended this nondiscrimination principle to unequal
benefits payments. Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity &
Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983). Following the decisions
in Manhart and Norris, nearly all employers have adjusted their pension plans to
conform to the requirements the two decisions set forth. EEOC Policy Guidance
On Retroactive Relief for Discriminatory Employee Retirement Plans, [Jan. - June]
Pension Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 103 (Jan. 16, 1989).
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wages he or she receives at the end of the week. Pension and retirement
plans which the Court has repeatedly excluded from article 119 pro-
tection should fall within the employment contract just as pay does.
Consideration runs from the employer to the employee in the form
of pay, benefits, pension and retirement benefits. In return, the
employee performs his job according to the employer's directions.
Since the Court refused to apply article 119 to social security
schemes, pension schemes, redundancy pension schemes and other
matters that do not qualify under the restrictive definition of "pay,"
plaintiffs were able to recover in very few circumstances. To be
protected, the plaintiff must first be an employee of the State under
Marshall, since the Equal Treatment Directive does not apply to
private employers,' thus only state employees will be able to obtain
relief under the Equal Treatment Directive. Second, the Court must
decide that the discrimination in fact amounts to "pay."' 47 The Court
followed this reasoning in Worringham. 4 Although the case involved
an occupational pension scheme which ordinarily is excluded from
article 119, the Court deemed the contributions to the scheme to be
"pay."' 49 If the Court had decided otherwise, the plaintiff would
have been unable to gain relief because the Equal Treatment Directive
does not apply to occupational schemes. Lastly, if the Court rules
that directives have "horizontal" as well as "vertical" effect, plaintiffs
who are not State employees would have another avenue of relief.
By taking this step, the Court would recognize the economic and
social goals underlying article 119150 and give credence to the notion
of equality of treatment as a "fundamental right."''
The pecuniary consequences of pension and retirement schemes,
including redundancy plans, is apparent. For example, if an employer
forces a female to retire five years earlier than her male counterpart,
this amounts to five years less that she will be paid. By the same
token, denying Barber his full redundancy pay simply because he
'" 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 724, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 689.
,,1 See Worringham and Humphreys v. Lloyds Bank Ltd., 1981 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 767, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. 1; see also Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v.
Weber von Hartz, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1607, [1986] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep.
701.
"18 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 767, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 1.
1,9 Id. at 795.
11O Defrenne [II], 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1378, [1976] Comm. Mkt. L.
Rep. at 111.
"I Defrenne I1, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1365, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.
Rep. at 312.
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had not met the requisite age for a male, when a similarly situtated
women would have received the pay, is discriminatory."52 This, in
turn, means Barber was denied pay based on his gender which article
119 prohibits as discrimination.' If the European Court were to
abandon its strict, inadequate definitions of "pay" and "treatment,"
it could freely uphold the "fundamental right" principle it declared
it was mandated to ensure in Defrenne [II]. 4 Furthermore, this
would enable the Court to attain the economic and social goals article
119 was intended to meet. 55
The European Court has broken some significant ground in Barber.
First, it held that the fact that certain benefits are paid after ter-
mination of employment does not prevent them from being "pay"
as defined under article 119.156 Furthermore, the Court went on to
state that article 119 applies even where redundancy compensation
derives from legislation rather than from the contract of employ-
ment. 57 Second, the Court made a blanket statement that occupational
pension schemes, contributory or noncontributory, were part of the
consideration paid by employers to employees, so long as the scheme
was in no way financed by the state.' The Court also stated that
a sex-differentiated age condition with respect to pensions paid under
a contracted-out private occupational pension scheme was contrary
to article 119.' 59 The rule applied even where the difference was based
on pensionable ages set by the national social security scheme.60
Lastly, the Court unequivocally granted direct effect of article 119
to private occupational pension and redundancy schemes by defining
these schemes as components of renumeration. 6
152 Barber, 1990 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at -, [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep.
at 519.
-, EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at article 119.
'" 1978 E.Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1378, [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 312.
- [1978] 3 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 329. The economic goal is to ensure that
Member States which implement the equality principle are not placed at a comparative
disadvantage vis-a-vis those states which continue to discriminate. The social goal
is to improve living and working conditions. Id.
156 Barber, 1990 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at -, [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep.
at 523.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. The direct effect of article 119 may not be relied upon in order to claim
entitlement to an occupational pension with effect from a date prior to May 17,
1990, except in the case of workers (or those claiming under the articles) who have
prior to that date already initiated legal proceedings or raised an equivalent claim
under the applicable national law. Id.
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Barber is unprecedented in its broad interpretation of article 119
and its application to pension schemes. 62 The Court rejected Defrenne
[I] outright saying, "[play that is prescribed by law does not for that
reason fall outside the scope of article 119."'163 The Court pointed
out that in Defrenne [III it clearly held that article 119 was particularly
applicable to discrimination stemming from national legislation.' 64
Moreover, the pension scheme at issue in Barber was financed solely
by the employer's contributions and the contributions were paid by
the trustees of the fund. 165 The Court construed these sums paid by
the employer to the trustees of the fund as indirect consideration
and, therefore, tantamount to "pay" as defined under article 119.'66
Although the Court was unwilling to give horizontal direct effect
to the equality directives, specifically the Equal Treatment Directive,
it did concede that a contracted-out private occupational scheme falls
within the scope of article 119. If the Court had decided to give the
Equal Treatment Directive horizontal effect, it would have been forced
to overrule Marshall and was unwilling to do so. However, the
dilemma facing plaintiffs with an unequal treatment claim and the
lack of horizontal effects will be obsolete if the Court decides to
continue applying article 119 to historically unequal treatment issues
as it did in Barber.67
The Barber Court made some very positive changes in the law of
sex discrimination as it pertains to retirement and pension plans. The
162 The decision in Barber has been compared to the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983). The
impact on multinational firms is predicted to be even greater, since more.plan design
features are likely to vary by sex in the EEC than in the United States prior to the
Norris decision. Pension plan options most likely affected include pensions for spouses
and dependents, early and late retirement provisions, bridging pensions and waiting
periods which indirectly discriminate against men or women. Multinational Firms
with Pension Plans Seen Affected by EC Discrimination Ruling, [July-Dec.] Daily
Labor Report (BNA) No. 131, at A-13 (July 9, 1990).
163 Id. at A-13.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. The Court cites Worringham, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 789, [1981]
2 Comm. Mkt. L. Rep. at 523. The Court stated that:
Sums . . .which are included in the calculation of the gross salary payable
to the employee and which directly determine the calculation of other
advantages linked to the salary, such as redundancy payments ... form
part of the worker's pay within the meaning of article 119(2) of the Treaty
even if they are immediately deducted by the employer and paid to a pension
fund on behalf of the employee.
Id.
167 Id.
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Court successfully expanded article 119 without upsetting a private
employer's immunity from the Equal Treatment Directive by estab-
lishing horizontal direct effects. Actually, the avenue the Court took
is more appropriate in light of the previously declared, yet still
developing, fundamental right to sexual equality. Perhaps the most
positive change is the implication that "pay" and "treatment" are
really elements of a greater concept - the employment contract as a
package of terms, benefits and pay.
IV. CONCLUSION
European Economic Community law concerning equal treatment
has suffered through tortured interpretations and harsh results. By
limiting its definition of "pay" to the actual salary an employee
receives, the European Court had found itself trapped between up-
holding traditional European Economic Community definitions and
the fundamental principle of freedom from sexual discrimination.
Unfortunately, the Court spent many years relying on strict inter-
pretations of the articles of the EEC Treaty. Plaintiffs were turned
away without a remedy, since their claim did not qualify as "pay"
under article 119. With the Barber decision, it seems the Court is
broadening its definition of "pay" and, at least, curbing the futile
distinction between "pay" and "treatment" in the area of pension
and redundancy plans.
R. Mace Flournoy
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